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First Steps
Intelligence Analysis in Canada during the
Second World War
ALAN BARNES
Abstract : At the outset of the Second World War decision-makers in
Ottawa were entirely dependent on the United Kingdom for finished
intelligence on foreign military and political developments. During six
years of war the intelligence work carried out in Canada expanded in
several areas, and included a growing capacity to carry out intelligence
analysis in several fields. An analytic group was established to exploit
the mass of detailed information collected by the postal censorship
programme. The Department of External Affairs created a small unit
that drew on signals intercepts and other sources to assess political issues
for senior officials. In the Department of National Defence, the newlycreated Joint Intelligence Committee took the first steps in producing
strategic intelligence assessments from a Canadian perspective. These
developments were all heavily influenced by Canada’s close intelligence
relations with the UK and US. A major impediment to the development
of an independent analytic capacity, however, was the lack of demand
for Canadian-origin intelligence assessments from senior political and
military leaders in Ottawa, who continued to look to allies for intelligence
to inform national-level decisions.

C

with little capacity to
collect or analyse foreign intelligence, and little interest in doing
so. Any intelligence Ottawa needed to make decisions regarding its
foreign and defence policies was provided by the United Kingdom. But
as the war progressed, Canada came to recognise the need to create
its own intelligence capacity, particularly the ability to collect signals
intelligence. This wartime effort laid the foundations for Canada’s
involvement in the post-war “Five-Eyes” intelligence partnership that
anada entered the second world war
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exists to the present day. The story of the birth of Canada’s signals
intelligence organisation has sparked considerable scholarly interest.1
Another aspect of the wartime development of Canada’s foreign
intelligence capabilities has received less attention: Ottawa’s initial
efforts in producing independent intelligence analysis. The collection
of secret information is an important part of the intelligence process,
but it is seldom sufficient in itself. While in rare cases such secret
reporting can feed directly into government decisions, more often
individual covert intelligence reports only provide fragmentary and
often conflicting snippets of information that need to be organised,
compared with other sources and analysed in order to draw out
their full significance. At a higher level of complexity, intelligence
assessments which make forward-looking judgements about likely
enemy actions can play a major role in national decision-making. The
lack of such a capacity can have significant consequences. As just one
example, when Canada received a request from the UK in 1941 to
send troops to reinforce the garrison of Hong Kong, Ottawa had no
independent ability to gauge the risks involved and in making this
important decision relied on London’s assessment.2
This article examines the various forms of intelligence analysis
carried out in Canada during the Second World War in support
of government decision-making or which contributed to the overall
Allied intelligence effort. Canadians also carried out operational
and tactical level intelligence analysis in the formations and units
serving in active theatres overseas, but this activity took place
within the framework of Allied intelligence structures and deserves
its own study.3 In Canada, the war marked the beginning of efforts to

See in particular John Bryden, Best Kept Secret: Canadian Secret Intelligence in
the Second World War (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1993); Kurt Jensen, Cautious
Beginnings: Canadian Foreign Intelligence, 1939-51 (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 2008); and Wesley Wark, “The Evolution of Military Intelligence in
Canada,” Armed Forces and Society 16, 1 (Fall 1989): 77-98.
2  
In the case of Hong Kong, it not clear that an independent Canadian assessment
body would have come to a conclusion that differed from the flawed UK and US
evaluation of the imminence of war with Japan, but the fact remains that Canada
was entirely dependent on the judgement of others in making this decision.
3  
S.R. Elliot, Scarlet to Green: A History of Intelligence in the Canadian Army,
1903-1963 (Toronto: Canadian Intelligence and Security Association, 1981) provides
a comprehensive account of the intelligence work carried out overseas by the
Canadian Army.
1  
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carry out national-level intelligence analysis and to produce strategic
intelligence assessments.

exploiting canadian intelligence collection
During the Second World War Canada developed a limited capacity
to collect intelligence through the interrogation of prisoners of war
and postal censorship. To produce useful intelligence, this required
an analytical component to identify and synthesise the relevant
information from the mass of detail obtained from these sources.
In 1939 Canada had no experience in such work and early efforts
were hampered by a lack of clear direction and poor organisational
coordination.

prisoner of war intelligence
Most German prisoners of war in Canada were transferred from
Britain, and as the detaining power the UK retained responsibility
for many aspects of their treatment, including intelligence matters.
Canadian officials gradually became more involved as the war
progressed, but largely in a supporting role. Most intelligence work
involving prisoners of war related to monitoring security in the camps
and obtaining material for use in UK and later US psychological
warfare operations. For most of the war any analysis of intelligence
gathered from German prisoners in Canada was carried out by Allied
officers to meet Allied requirements. The Department of External
Affairs (DEA) was keen that Canada should play a larger role, but
this was not a priority for the military.4 It was not until May 1944
that National Defence approved the establishment of a Prisoner of
War Intelligence Section, subordinate to the Director of Military
Intelligence. Some forty intelligence officers were assigned to camps
in Canada to carry out interrogations largely focussed on obtaining
order of battle and other military information to contribute to the

4  
Jean-Michel Turcotte, “‘An Important Contribution to the Allied War Effort’:
Canadian and North Atlantic Intelligence on German POWs, 1940–1945,” Intelligence
and National Security 34, 2 (2019): 289-306; and Don Page, “Tommy Stone and
Psychological Warfare in World War Two: Transforming a POW Liability into an
Asset,” Journal of Canadian Studies 16, 3 & 4 (Fall-Winter 1981): 110-120.
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overall Allied intelligence effort. Canadian naval intelligence also
had a section dealing with naval prisoners of war.5 Little evidence
remains of this work. The only report that appears to have survived
in archival files is a staff list and description of the German naval
training school at Flensburg-Mürwik.6 Whatever information of
military value that German prisoners may have possessed was
largely outdated by the time they arrived in Canada, and there was
no effective analytical capacity to support the work of the officers
carrying out interrogations.

analysing censorship information
The collection of foreign intelligence via postal censorship eventually
achieved greater success but at the beginning of the war it was
hampered by a lack of direction and coordination. Departments were
flooded with hundreds of unsorted reports derived from intercepted
mail and telegrams from foreign countries. By December 1941 the
file room in External Affairs had a backlog of thousands of unread
postal intercepts. The department was not responsible for censorship
but saw its potential value as a source of intelligence. By default,
it took the lead in addressing the problem. George Glazebrook—an
academic historian brought into the department for wartime duty
who would go on to play a major role in the post-war Canadian
intelligence community—put forward proposals for centralising and
providing clearer direction to censorship operations.7 As a result, in
May 1942 all aspects of the censorship function were brought under
the authority of the Minister of National War Service. In addition to
performing a security role by reviewing outgoing mail from Canada,

5  
John Roach, “History of Canadian Naval Intelligence, 1910-1968,” in Out of
Darkness—Light: A History of Canadian Military Intelligence, Vol. 3, 1998-2005,
Hal Skaarup (New York: iUniverse, 2005), 537.
6  
Jensen, Cautious Beginnings, 80-82.
7  
Don Page, “Special DEA [Department of External Affairs] Wartime Assignments,”
n.d. (c. March 1982), 5, 16, 43, RG25 BAN 2016-0036, Box 32, File 7-5-2 Part 1,
Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Page was one of External Affairs’ official
historians. Interestingly, most of the text of this manuscript later appeared in
print as Peter St. John, “Canada’s Accession to the Allied Intelligence Community,
1940-45,” Conflict Quarterly (Fall 1984): 5-21, perhaps as a way to circumvent
departmental restrictions on publishing on this subject. See also John Hilliker,
Canada’s Department of External Affairs, Vol. I – The Early Years, 1909-1946
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990), 268.
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the censorship organisation made a concerted effort to derive foreign
military and economic intelligence from correspondence arriving in
Canada from enemy-occupied areas, especially letters to German
prisoners of war and civilian internees.8 The analysis of the mass of
detail to derive broader conclusions was essential to extracting the
full value of this information.
By 1943 the postal censorship effort had expanded to 300 examiners
reviewing tens of thousands of pieces of incoming correspondence
each month.9 Through the adoption of a more systematic approach to
managing the volume of mail and the hiring of university graduates
to analyse the material, the postal censorship organisation was able
to produce comprehensive reports on specific issues.10 A typical report
from January 1943 drew on 500 letters over a two-month period
to describe conditions in the Saar region of Germany, including
information on air raids, food, heath and morale.11 Regular monthly
reports were produced on conditions in Germany. For the March 1945
issue 56,000 letters were reviewed. The report included a statistical
analysis of German morale, tallying examples of “positive” morale
(support for the leadership, faith in the prospect of victory, etc.) and
“negative” morale (criticism of the authorities, war-weariness, etc.);
a graph illustrated trends in morale over the previous six months.
Postal censorship also prepared reports on other European countries,
including France and Italy. One example was a report on France
from June 1945 that described French attitudes towards the Allies,
General de Gaulle and collaborators, among other subjects.12
These assessed censorship reports went to a number of officials
in Ottawa, but they were of limited use for Canadian purposes. The
major recipients were the censorship organisations in London and
Washington, where the reports contributed to the Allied psychological
warfare campaign and the strategic intelligence analysis that was being
Jensen, Cautious Beginnings, 74-78.
Kurt Jensen, “Canadian Wartime Human Intelligence Collection: Intelligence
Derived from Prisoners of War,” in Battleground Western Europe: Intelligence
Operations in Germany and the Netherlands in the 20th Century, eds. Beatrice de
Graaf, Ben de Jong and Weis Platje (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 2007), 85-86.
10  
Page, “Special DEA Wartime Assignments,” 44.
11  
Canadian Postal Censorship, “Report on Economic Conditions in the Saar Basin,”
Regional Report No. 15, 9 January 1943, RG24, Vol. 11250, File 10-2-7, LAC.
12  
Canadian Postal Censorship, “Report on Conditions in Germany,” Periodical
Diary No. 45, 12 March 1945; and “Conditions in France,” Report No. 1, 1 June
1945, both in RG25, Vol. 2846, File 1520-C-40 Part 2, LAC.
8  
9  
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undertaken in those capitals. In 1943 some 800 Canadian intelligence
reports a month—most of them derived from postal censorship—were
being sent to Washington. The US Office of Strategic Services (OSS)
valued the Canadian censorship reports as inputs to their own analysis
of the situation in Germany. The Canadian postal censors worked
closely with their US and UK counterparts; in August 1943 the heads
of the three censorship programmes met in Miami to coordinate their
activities.13 The Canadian postal censorship programme was very
much a part of a larger Allied effort.

intelligence analysis in external affairs
The Second World War marked Canada’s entry into the world of
signals intelligence, the systematic interception and decryption of
foreign telegram and radio messages. A small organisation known
as the Examination Unit was established in June 1941 under the
administrative umbrella of the National Research Council to decrypt
and distribute the intercepted messages. The raw traffic came from
military intercept facilities and encrypted messages obtained by the
censorship authorities. As the new organisation gradually found its
feet, a stream of transcripts of individual intercepted messages—
mostly Vichy French and Japanese communications with their
missions in the Americas—began to reach senior officials in External
Affairs and elsewhere in government.14

creating the special intelligence section
External Affairs, however, was not entirely satisfied with this new
material. As an unpublished internal history of DEA’s wartime
intelligence activities notes: “The problem with raw intelligence
coming from the Examination Unit was that it was never placed
in a broad context where its significance could be appreciated for
making decisions. External Affairs needed analysed rather than raw

Jensen, Cautious Beginnings, 83-84.
Gilbert de B. Robinson, ed., A History of the Examination Unit, 1941-1945, July
1945, RG24, Vol. 29166, File WWII-31, LAC; and Jensen, Cautious Beginnings,
38-55.
13  
14  

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol29/iss1/1
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E. Herbert Norman. [Canada. National Film Board/Library and Archives Canada/PA-134317]

intelligence.”15 In September 1942, at Glazebrook’s urging, External
Affairs formed a Special Intelligence Section to meet this requirement.
The Section was headed by E. Herbert Norman, a former member of
the embassy in Tokyo recently returned from Japanese internment.
A Japanese-speaker, he had solid academic credentials as an expert
on the politics and economics of Japan. The new Section was
responsible for “the preparation of intelligence reports, in which will
be brought together secret information which comes in from various
sources concerning Japan and the Far East.”16 In his short history of

Page, “Special DEA Wartime Assignments,” 17. The work of the Section is also
briefly described in J.L. Granatstein and David Stafford, Spy Wars: Espionage and
Canada from Gouzenko to Glasnost (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1990), 41-42.
16  
Norman Robertson memo to DEA divisional heads, 25 September 1942, RG24,
Vol. 29165, File WWII-15, Part 4, LAC.
15  
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345 Laurier Ave. E. in Ottawa, the location of the Examination Unit and the DEA Special
Intelligence Section. [Canada. Dept. of Interior / Library and Archives Canada / PA-034301]

the Section written at the end of the war, Norman describes his job
as “selecting, editing and otherwise interpreting the material which
was produced by the Examination Unit.”17
In order to be close to the source of its main raw material, the
Special Intelligence Section was housed in the same building as the
Examination Unit on Laurier Avenue in Ottawa, but organisationally
it remained part of External Affairs. It was never larger than two
officers, supported by three clerks and secretaries. In November 1942
Norman was joined by Arthur Menzies to work on Vichy French
traffic and, as Menzies commented in a later interview, to do anything
that “Norman did not want to do.”18 Menzies was replaced by G.W.
Hilborn in February 1944.19 Norman remained with the Section
throughout its existence and was its driving force.

Herbert Norman, “Special Intelligence Section of the Department of External
Affairs,” in A History of the Examination Unit, ed. Robinson, 1, RG24, Vol. 29166,
File WWII-31, Part 1, LAC.
18  
Jensen, Cautious Beginnings, 52.
19  
Norman, “Special Intelligence Section,” 2.
17  

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol29/iss1/1
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the special intelligence section’s assessment work
Initially, the reports produced by the Section primarily involved
combining and summarising the intercepts received from the
Examination Unit, often with added interpretive comments and
cross-references to other reports.20 Such “single-source” reports
(i.e. reports derived from a single type of information, in this case
signals intercepts) continued to represent an important product of
the Section, but Norman soon also began preparing assessments
based on a wider range of sources and addressing broader topics. In
addition to the intercepts from the Examination Unit, the Section
had access to Canadian and Allied censorship reports, transcripts of
radio broadcasts, newspaper reports and occasional debriefings from
civilians repatriated from enemy territory, as well as the regular
diplomatic reporting available to External Affairs. The earliest
such “all-source” report is an October 1942 summary of Japanese
attitudes towards the repatriation of civilians; it was based on signals
intercepts, radio broadcasts and censorship reports.21
Over the next two years the Section produced a stream of analytic
reports, with the main focus being Japan. Some, such as a detailed
nineteen-page list of key Japanese officials derived from the monitoring
of Japanese radio broadcasts, were probably intended primarily as
reference documents to assist the work of the Examination Unit and
postal censors.22 Other reports consolidated factual information from
a variety of sources to provide a broader picture of a given issue.
Examples include descriptions of changes in the Japanese cabinet,
Japan’s diplomatic “listening posts” in South America and Ireland,
and the background of the Japanese politician Satoshi Akao.23 In a
covering note to a report on Tokyo’s reaction to the surrender of Italy,
Norman remarked that he used diplomatic intercepts and broadcast
monitoring reports and “tried to draw them all together to present

Ibid., 3.
DEA Report, “Material Relating to the Repatriation of Americans, British and
Canadians from the Far East,” 10 October 1942, RG25, BAN 2016-00628-5, Box
6, File AD-2, LAC. Unless otherwise noted, all of the Special Intelligence Section
reports cited are from this file.
22  
DEA Report, “List of Japanese Personalities of Current Interest,” 17 August 1943.
23  
DEA Reports, “Recent Changes in the Japanese Cabinet and High Command,” 29
February 1944; “Japanese Listening Posts,” 28 June 1943; and “Note on Bin Akao,”
n.d. (c. January 1944).
20  
21  
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what still remains a very incomplete and fragmentary picture.”24
The true value of Norman’s expertise was reflected in a number of
assessments that sought to go beyond the available facts to reach
forward-looking conclusions. An early example is a January 1943
assessment on the question of whether Japan was planning to attack
the Soviet Union; based on his reading of all the available sources of
information, Norman laid out the various factors likely influencing
Tokyo’s decision, but ultimately he declined to make a judgement on
this military question.25 More substantial conclusions were reached in
Norman’s April 1943 paper on the likely impact on Japanese policy
of the recent appointment of a new Japanese foreign minister, and a
March 1943 overall assessment of “Japanese Prospects and Policy.”26
A hand-written annotation on the latter paper indicates that Prime
Minister Mackenzie King had passed it to British Foreign Minister
Anthony Eden, an indication that Norman’s reports were read and
valued at senior levels.
Arthur Menzies was also involved in writing reports on Japanese
subjects, even if his main focus was Vichy and Free French traffic. In
November 1942, just after arriving in the Section, he prepared reports
on Japan’s economic situation and on Tokyo’s propaganda efforts.
The reports, based on a range of sources, were largely descriptive as
Menzies did not have Norman’s expertise on Japan that would enable
him to reach broader conclusions.27 The Section’s reporting on French
activities included a description of Vichy negotiations with China
over trade privileges, the visit of two Canadian journalists to Algiers
at the invitation of the Free French authorities there, the Free French
position concerning negotiations over a mutual aid agreement with
Canada, and financial assistance from the Vichy regime to academic
and religious institutions in Canada. The last three of these reports

Norman to Hume Wrong, 21 September 1943, RG24, Vol. 29163, File WWII-5,
Part 3, LAC; and DEA Report, “Japanese Reaction to the Surrender of Italy,” 21
September 1943.
25  
DEA Report, “Is Japan Preparing to Attack the Soviet Union?” 22 January 1943.
26  
DEA Reports, “Recent Change of Japanese Foreign Minister and the Course of
Japanese Policy,” 23 April 1943; and “Japanese Prospects and Policy,” 29 March
1943.
27  
DEA Reports, “Japan’s Economic Position,” 1 November 1943; and “‘East Asia
Charter’ and ‘Bougainville Victory’ Climax of Japan’s Propaganda Campaign,” 22
November 1943.
24  
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were written by G.W. Hilborn who had replaced Menzies in the
Section.28
In addition to reporting on Japanese and French matters, the
Section produced analytical reports on a range of other subjects. In
two detailed reports in March and April 1944, Hilborn provided a
comprehensive assessment of Anglo-American diplomatic efforts to
pressure Spain to abide by its neutral status. The factual aspects of the
report likely drew on intercepts of Spanish diplomatic communications
as well as press reports. In his analysis Hilborn examined not only
Madrid’s actions but also the policy differences between Washington
and London that complicated the discussions.29
In October 1943 Norman wrote a long report on the morale of
the German population and prospects for political (i.e. psychological)
warfare, based on Canadian and US censorship reports and media
articles rather than signals intercepts.30 Nevertheless, most reports
by the Section were on subjects related to Asia, including papers
on the implications for East Asia of the restoration of the Orthodox
Patriarchate by Moscow, Chinese internal politics, the Indian
nationalist leader Subhas Chandra Bose, the issue of Burmese
independence and a list of Burmese personalities. These reports,
based on press monitoring and historical information, were largely
descriptive since the Section did not have deep expertise in these
areas or access to relevant signals intercepts.31
The reports produced by the Section were distributed to a small
group of senior officials in External Affairs and to the three service
intelligence directors. At least some reached the prime minister.
Copies were also sent to British Security Co-ordination (BSC) in
New York, a key link between the nascent Canadian intelligence

DEA Reports, “Negotiations for Retrocession of French Privileges in China,” 14
April 1943; “Visit to Algiers of Willson Woodside and Joseph Barnard,” 7 February
1944; “Canadian-French Mutual Aid Agreement,” 11 March 1944; and “Financial
Assistance Given by French to Institutions in Canada,” 6 October 1944.
29  
DEA Reports, “Recent Anglo-American Negotiations with Spain,” 23 March
1944; and “Anglo-American Demands on Spain,” 5 April 1944.
30  
DEA Report, “Morale in Germany and Opportunities for Political Warfare,” 26
October 1943.
31  
DEA Reports, “Far Eastern Repercussions of the Restoration of the Patriarchate
in the Soviet Union,” 19 February 1944; “Chungking Policy Towards Chinese
Puppets,” 21 February 1944; “Memorandum on Subhas Chandra Bose,” 6 July
1943; “Burmese Independence,” 2 August 1943; and “List of Burman Personalities of
Current Interest,” 3 September 1943.
28  
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community and its UK—and US—counterparts. The mechanism
for the tasking of assessments is not clear; it is likely that many of
the papers were written on the initiative of Norman, Menzies and
Hilborn based on the available intelligence and their knowledge of
departmental interests. Some requests for papers came direct from
External Affairs, and BSC also had input into tasking.32
Norman sought to establish relations with allied analytical
groups. In visits to Washington he met with US Army analysts, and
on other occasions he was able to discuss developments in the Far
East with American and British officers passing through Ottawa.33
The Section’s closest links appear to have been with the Research
Branch of the US Office of Strategic Services. The OSS, a newcomer
to the Washington bureaucracy, did not have access to US signals
intercepts and was pleased to receive the Section’s summaries of
Canadian intercepts (the verbatim texts were not shared).34 It is
likely that the OSS received some of the Section’s analytical reports
as well, since Norman had established direct working relations with
OSS analysts and he received OSS reports on a variety of subjects.35
His October 1943 paper “The Japanese in the Netherlands East
Indies” was partially based on discussions with OSS analysts during
a visit he made to Washington.36 The OSS’s outsider status in the
US Intelligence community likely meant that the Section’s analysis
received scant attention from the other agencies in Washington and
thus had little impact on the assessments prepared by the US Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC).

untimely demise of the special intelligence section
Paradoxically, these efforts to build links to the US entangled the
Section in the rivalries among intelligence agencies in Washington
and ultimately led to its abolition. In mid-1944 the US military raised
objections to the sharing of the Section’s intercept summaries with
the OSS and threatened to end cooperation with the Examination
Unit if it continued. Lester Pearson, then at the Canadian embassy
Page, “Special DEA Wartime Assignments,” 18.
Norman, “Special Intelligence Section,” 9.
34  
Bryden, Best Kept Secret, 197.
35  
Ibid., 231.
36  
DEA Report, “The Japanese in the Netherlands East Indies,” 16 October 1943,
RG24, Vol. 29163, File WWII-5, Part 3, LAC.
32  
33  
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in Washington, was instructed to tell the OSS that it would cease
receiving the summaries as they were no longer available. As historian
John Bryden comments, “this excuse was given an aura of truth by
closing Norman’s little office.”37
In January 1945 the Section was shut down and the staff
returned to External Affairs’ offices in the East Block of the
Parliament Buildings.38 Norman and a colleague continued to read
and summarise Japanese and French intercepts for the department,
but this seems to have occurred on a more intermittent basis. In his
history of the Section, Norman mentions that occasional memoranda
based on the Japanese traffic were also produced.39 Two examples
of such reports exist in the available archival record, compilations
of secret information received on Indochina and Thailand.40 The
production of such reports is unlikely to have continued for long,
however, since the end of the war would have rendered such work
superfluous in the view of External Affairs, and in September 1945
Norman was posted to serve as Canadian representative to the Allied
occupation authority in Japan.
The Special Intelligence Section was later described as “the
flagship of Canada’s codebreaking efforts” during the Second World
War.41 But its abolition marked the end of External Affairs’ brief
experiment with a dedicated intelligence assessment capacity.
Canadian diplomats would continue to produce political analysis as
part of their regular duties, but the department no longer had a
centre where analysts with deep expertise and immediate access to
all sources of information were able to provide broader context to
Bryden, Best Kept Secret, 251.
Norman Roberson letter to C.J. Mackenzie, 11 January 1945, RG24, Vol. 29167,
File WWII-33, LAC. In January 1945, as the Section was being dismantled and in
the midst of deliberations on the postwar future of Canadian signals intelligence,
Norman proposed the creation of a “Canadian Signal Intelligence Centre” which
would continue Canada’s wartime interception and cryptographic work and include
a Special Intelligence Section to prepare assessments based on this and other
information (Bryden, Best Kept Secret, 253). However, such an all-source analytical
unit was not included in the Canadian signals intelligence organisation which
emerged after the war.
39  
Norman, “Special Intelligence Section,” 9-10.
40  
DEA reports, “Secret Information Received by the Department […] Concerning
Developments in Indochina,” 24 September 1945; and “Secret Information Regarding
Recent Developments in Thailand,” 26 September 1945, both in RG24, Vol. 29167,
File WWII-33, LAC.
41  
Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, 41.
37  
38  
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the raw intelligence and make informed judgements on questions of
interest to the department and Canada. As the External Affairs
official historian commented, the Section’s “usefulness depended on
its ability to make sense out of the information derived from the
[Examination] Unit’s decoded translations and to fit these into the
broader context of the war.” He went on to add:
Precisely how important the Section’s work was for External Affairs is
difficult to measure since like most intelligence information it became
blurred with other factors in making decisions. It certainly gave officials
a wider perspective on international happenings that [they] could not
have otherwise acquired and advance insight on positions to be taken
at important gatherings.42

Because of its premature demise, the wartime experience of the
Section had little impact on the development of Canada’s strategic
assessment capacity in the years following the Second World War, a
process that was largely driven by the military. It was to be another
three decades before External Affairs would begin to develop a
dedicated political intelligence analysis capability.43

intelligence analysis in national defence
In the Department of National Defence, the three service intelligence
directorates were responsible for providing intelligence to their
respective Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC),
but their capacity to do so was slow to develop and heavily dependent
on allies. Canadian forces overseas received intelligence from the
Allied formations under whose command they served, and National
Defence Headquarters looked to the UK for strategic intelligence.
Intelligence analysis was barely an after-thought for the military. Lloyd
Kenyon, an Army officer deeply involved with post-war intelligence,
later commented that during the war no intelligence analysis was
done in Ottawa; there was nobody looking at the world situation

Page, “Special DEA Wartime Assignments,” 18, 20.
See Alan Barnes, “A Confusion, not a System: The Organizational Evolution
of Strategic Intelligence Assessment in Canada, 1943 to 2003,” Intelligence and
National Security 34, 4 (2019): 464-479.

42  
43  
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Department of National Defence Headquarters in 1947. [Canada. Department of National

Defence / Library and Archives Canada MIKAN 4950811]

and making judgements about enemy capabilities and intentions.
Intelligence collected by Canada was sent to the Allies for analysis,
and in turn Canada received intelligence summaries, situation
reports and assessed intelligence from London and Washington. In
Kenyon’s recollection, officials in Ottawa were quite content with
this arrangement.44 His blunt remarks overstate the case, but not
by much. During the later years of the war, the Canadian military
did make some tentative steps into the field of strategic intelligence
analysis, as will be explored below.
Even before the war the limitations of having separate service
intelligence directorates was recognised by some, and a half-hearted
attempt was made to coordinate and consolidate at least some of
the intelligence work at headquarters. In April 1938, the Joint Staff

Interview with Brigadier General Lloyd Kenyon, 21 September 1983, Reel 2, Side
1 [segment 226-06], University of Victoria Canadian Military History Oral History
Collections, accessed 15 January 2018, http://contentdm.library.uvic.ca/cdm/
compoundobject/collection/ collection13/id/ 1192/rec/1.

44  
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Committee established a subcommittee to consider the feasibility of
creating a “Joint Service Intelligence Section” that would combine some
of the common functions of the service intelligence directorates. Midlevel officers representing the intelligence staffs met to discuss various
ideas for establishing closer working relations, share information and
cooperate in matters common to all three services, such as by setting
up a joint central registry where information from all sources would be
collated. The army and air intelligence representatives shared varying
degrees of support for these ideas. The naval representative, however,
was strongly opposed, concerned that any change would interfere
with the integral role of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) in the
British Admiralty’s worldwide intelligence network. Not surprisingly,
after several inconclusive meetings, the idea was quietly shelved.45
The service intelligence directorates went on to fight the war very
much as independent fiefdoms.

military intelligence
The Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) was the largest of the
three service intelligence staffs. At the outbreak of war the intelligence
function was part of the Directorate of Military Operations and
Intelligence, but in June 1942 DMI was established as a separate
directorate under the command of Colonel W.W. (Jock) Murray,
a First World War veteran brought back into the Army in 1939
from his job as a Canadian Press parliamentary reporter to run
the early telegram censorship programme.46 By the end of the war
the organisation he controlled numbered just over 100 personnel, of
whom forty-two were officers. The Foreign Intelligence Section, or
MI-1, had nine officers and twenty-four support staff to cover foreign
military forces and military operations worldwide. A larger number
of DMI personnel dealt with security, and there were other groups
responsible for overseeing the Army’s involvement in the signals
intelligence effort, prisoner of war intelligence and administration.
Much of the work of DMI was administrative in nature, including

Documents on the proposed Joint Service Intelligence section can be found in
RG24, Vol. 4052, File 1078-11-30, LAC, and RG24, Vol. 2696, File 5199-G, LAC.
46  
Elliot, Scarlet to Green, 425-7; and Bryden, Best Kept Secret, 10, 21.
45  
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Colonel W.W. “Jock” Murray, Director of Military Intelligence, July 1942 to February 1946.
[Courtesy of the Canadian Forces School of Military Intelligence, Department of National Defence]

the creation of the Canadian Intelligence Corps and overseeing the
training of Army intelligence personnel.47
MI-1 was responsible for keeping the Chiefs of Staff and senior
civilian officials informed about the progress of the war. Initially, the
section did little more than “cut up newspapers,” in the dismissive

“Mobilization Establishment – DMI,” n.d. (c. 1953), RG24, Vol. 19211, File
S-2140-75/73, Part 1, LAC; and Elliot, Scarlet to Green, 438. This document includes
a description of the wartime DMI organisation.

47  
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Directorate of Military Intelligence, Foreign Intelligence Section (MI-1), 13 December 1944.
[Courtesy of the Canadian Forces School of Military Intelligence, Department of National Defence]

view of one of their naval colleagues.48 After Canadian troops
landed in Normandy, DMI provided the Prime Minister, Minister of
Defence and the Chiefs of Staff with daily situation updates based
on summaries provided by the UK and US. But rather than being
intelligence reports, in the sense of dealing with enemy actions
and intentions, these updates largely covered activities of Allied
forces.49 MI-1 maintained an Information Room with maps of the
battlefronts. Following a visit to the room, Minister of Defence
Andrew McNaughton asked whether the information that Ottawa
received was being properly interpreted, and stressed the need for
officers capable of assimilating this information and using it to make
forward-looking judgements. He received the faint assurance that the
staff was doing the best possible job with the limited information

Lieutenant Commander F.R.W.R. Gow memo to Chief of the Naval Staff, 23 July
1938, RG24, Vol. 4052, File 1078-11-30, LAC.
49  
Joint Intelligence Committee [JIC] Minutes, 15 June 1944, RG24, Vol. 2469, File
715-10-16-1-3, Part 3, LAC.
48  
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available and was warned of the dangers of making judgements
without adequate information.50
DMI published a range of regular products, almost entirely
derived from material received from allies or press reporting. All
of these reports were sent to recipients in Ottawa and military
commands in Canada; DMI had no responsibility for providing
operational intelligence to Canadian forces deployed overseas. DMI
products included twice-daily news digests, battlefield situation maps
and a Weekly War Review. The Weekly War Review provided a
compendium of factual items on worldwide naval, ground and air
operations based on situation reports received from Canada’s allies,
with no analysis of enemy intentions or judgements concerning
possible future developments.51 DMI reproduced and disseminated
UK and US reports on enemy organisation, equipment and tactics
to headquarters and training establishments in Canada. It also
produced occasional reports on specific subjects, such as economic
intelligence reports on crop conditions in Europe and the economic
significance of Sardinia, as well as descriptive papers on the history,
geography and military forces of Siam and Persia.52 These descriptive
reports recycled information received from allies rather than being
original analysis. It is not clear who received these reports or what
they did with them, as they hardly seem relevant to any decisions
that Canadian officials faced.

naval intelligence
Naval intelligence in Canada was heavily influenced by the RCN’s
strong historical, operational and personal connections with
the Royal Navy. Since 1921 Canada had served as the “North
American Station” in the British Admiralty’s worldwide intelligence
Elliot, Scarlet to Green, 453.
Colonel W.W. Murray memo to Chiefs of Staff Committee, “Foreign Intelligence
in Peacetime, Annex E Background of NDHQ Intelligence, 1939-1945,” 26 September
1945, RG24, Vol. 6178, File 22-1-43, Part. 1, LAC. Weekly War Review reports can
be found in RG24, Vols. 31018, and 31019, LAC.
52  
DMI Reports, “Economic Intelligence Report--Crop Conditions in Europe,” 18
August 1943; “Economic Intelligence Report--Economic Significance of Sardinia,”
19 August 1943; “Economic Intelligence Report--Economic Implications of the
Occupation of the Italian Mainland,” 20 August 1943; “Notes on Siam,” 2 December
1941; and “Persia (Iran),” 28 August 1941, RG25, Vol. 2933, File 2869-40, Part 1,
LAC.
50  
51  
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organisation.53 It was “responsible, through the [Canadian] Chief of
Naval Staff, to Admiralty for the collection of intelligence in the
North American Area.” In return, the RCN received “intelligence for
naval purposes on all parts of the world” from the UK.54 The other
intelligence staffs in Ottawa regarded naval intelligence as “working
for the Admiralty and not Canada.”55
When war broke out, Commander E.S. (Eric) Brand, a Royal Navy
officer seconded to Canada, was the Director of Naval Intelligence
and Plans. After several organisational changes, in June 1942
naval intelligence became a separate directorate under Lieutenant
Commander C.H. (Herbert) Little, the first Canadian to become
Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI).56 By then it had grown from
very small beginnings to an organisation of seven sections, dealing
with security, censorship, naval prisoners of war and a photographic
library. There were also three production sections, which prepared
daily ship location reports, periodic summary reports—including
the North American Station Intelligence Report (NASIR) for the
Admiralty—and political intelligence reports.57 DNI’s analytical
capacity was limited. The intelligence summaries it produced were
largely compilations of information gleaned from press reports and its
other limited sources of intelligence. For example, NASIR No. 8 from
August 1941 included items on German and Japanese merchant ship
movements in South America and on the US west coast and a large
section on US defence policy and economic developments, all derived
from press reports.58 By the end of the war DNI was producing
occasional reports on specific subjects, such as key air targets in
Japan, a description of the Yunnan administration in China and a
paper on the likelihood of a Japanese peace offer.59 These reports

Roach, “History of Canadian Naval Intelligence, 1910-1968,” 510-519.
Gow, draft memo, n.d. (c. July 1938), RG24, Vol. 4052, File 1078-11-30, LAC.
55  
Gow memo to Chief of the Naval Staff, 23 July 1938, RG24, Vol. 4052, File 107811-30, LAC.
56  
C.H. Little, “Now it Can All be Told,” in Salty Dips Vol. 3 (Ottawa: Naval Officers
Association of Canada, 1988), 218; Roach, “History of Canadian Naval Intelligence,”
519-38; and Bryden, Best Kept Secret, 10-13.
57  
Roach, “History of Canadian Naval Intelligence,” 536-37; and “Naval Intelligence
in Canada,” Canadian Forces School of Intelligence and Security, CFSIS Précis
8-603, n.d.
58  
North America Station Intelligence Report, NASIR No. 8, 1 August 1941, RG24,
Vol. 31019, File Intelligence Reports, Nov 1940-Sep 1941, LAC.
59  
“Naval Intelligence in Canada.”
53  
54  
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appear to be aimed largely at meeting Allied requirements and it is
unlikely that they were shared widely in Ottawa.
Unlike the other intelligence directorates in Ottawa, the RCN
played a major role in providing operational intelligence to Canadian
and Allied naval forces. After 1942, however, this activity took
place outside of DNI. Commander J. de Marbois was the driving
force in building the RCN’s capacity to locate enemy submarines
through radio direction finding and traffic analysis. In 1942 he was
instrumental in the establishment of an Operational Intelligence
Centre (OIC) in Ottawa. This body, made up of staff transferred
from DNI, was placed under the command of the Naval Signals
Division, which was responsible for the radio intercept stations that
gathered the raw intelligence.60 In April 1943, the RCN was given
command of the Canadian Northwest Atlantic theatre of operations,
the only independent theatre of war commanded by a Canadian.61
The existence of an effective OIC was a key requirement for the UK
and the US to entrust Canada with this responsibility, which for the
first time gave the RCN direct access to the ULTRA intercepts of
German naval communications.62

air intelligence
In the lean years of the 1930s, when the Royal Canadian Air
Force (RCAF) had dwindled to almost nothing, the Directorate of
Intelligence–Air (DIA) had for practical purposes been absorbed into
DMI. With the outbreak of war, it regained its independent existence,
but throughout hostilities it only numbered three intelligence officers
plus various technical advisors and a small staff to look after maps,
classified documents and other administrative matters. The leadership
of DIA passed through several hands before Group Captain H.R.
(Ronnie) Stewart was appointed to the position in June 1941. DIA
was largely concerned with order of battle information and technical
intelligence on enemy aircraft capabilities. As with the other service

Roach, “History of Canadian Naval Intelligence,” 538; and Bryden, Best Kept
Secret, 141-142.
61  
Marc Milner, Canada’s Navy: The First Century (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1999), 123.
62  
Roach, “History of Canadian Naval Intelligence,” 540-41; and Bryden, Best Kept
Secret, 180.
60  
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intelligence staffs, it relied on intelligence it received from allies to
support RCAF planning and training activities in Canada.63
Near the end of the war DIA became the home of a new
collaborative experiment, the Inter-Service Topographical Section.
This group was authorised by the Chiefs of Staff in November 1944
with the stipulation that this be done within existing resources. It
was housed in DIA because that directorate had available office
space. The section, with a planned strength of three officers and
seven supporting staff, was responsible for collecting photographs,
topographical studies and related maps to support all three service
intelligence directorates. It inherited the photographic library
previously maintained by DNI. Its civilian head, Dr. Diamond Jenness,
a noted anthropologist with extensive knowledge of the Canadian
arctic, made considerable efforts to tap into the equivalent UK and
US topographical intelligence organisations for relevant reports to
build up a topographical library.64 The Section was only gradually
getting established when the war in Europe ended in May 1945, but
it was to become deeply entangled in the debate over the postwar
structure of the Canadian intelligence community.

the canadian joint intelligence committee
In the early years of the war there was no formal mechanism to
coordinate the work of the three service intelligence directorates,
although they were all involved in the bodies overseeing various
aspects of the government’s intelligence work, such as censorship and
signals intelligence. On 5 June 1941 Norman Robertson, the UnderSecretary of State for External Affairs (deputy foreign minister),
hosted an informal meeting of officials involved in intelligence for the
Flying Officer W.A. Field memo, “Notes on a Conference on Co-ordination of
Intelligence Services in Canada,” 16 June 1941, RG24, Vol. 5230, File 19-15-16, Part
1, LAC; Wing Commander F.F. Lambert memo to Secretary JIC, “Reorganization
and Review of Existing Directorates of Intelligence in the Three Services,” 10 July
1946, RG24, Vol. 8164, File 1700-51, LAC; and James Cox, “Canadian Defence
Intelligence 1939-1946” (unpublished paper, Royal Military College of Canada, 9
December 2004), 13-14. Between 1939 and 1941 Wing Commander R.L. Logan and
Group Captain C.C. Walker (and possibly others) held the position of DIA.
64  
JIC Minutes, 16 November and 1 December 1944, and 27 February 1945, RG24,
Vol. 33541, File 1274-10, LAC; and Glazebrook memo to Robertson, 4 April 1945,
RG24, Vol. 29164, File WWII-8, LAC.
63  
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purpose of sharing “information as to intelligence activities and to
discuss means of improving co-operation and avoiding overlapping.”
At the meeting were the heads of the service intelligence directorates,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) intelligence and Tommy
Stone, the senior official in External Affairs responsible for
intelligence matters. The discussion appears to have largely focussed
on avoiding duplication of effort with the RCMP on security matters,
but broader issues were also considered, particularly the question
of the proper organisation of intelligence in Canada. A report on
this meeting prepared by the DIA representative includes a proposal
for a “Central Intelligence Committee” reporting to the Chiefs of
Staff Committee and composed of the service intelligence directors,
RCMP intelligence, External Affairs and the censorship organisation.
It would provide overall coordination for all of the bodies in Canada
involved in intelligence work, including security intelligence. It is
not clear whether this proposal was discussed at the June meeting
or formulated by DIA afterwards.65 In any case, no further action
was taken at this time to formalise the coordination of Canadian
intelligence.

formation of the jic
The entry of the United States into the war in December 1941 had
a huge impact on Canada, the military and the service intelligence
staffs. Until that time, they had looked to London for intelligence
reports, summaries and assessments, which were mostly provided
on a direct service-to-service basis. The intelligence staffs were now
desperate to increase the amount of information they obtained from
Washington, particularly on the situation in the Pacific. During
1942 service-to-service channels with the US Army and Navy were
established or strengthened, but this was not fully adequate. The
US had recently established a Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)
based on the model of the British JIC. Made up of the heads of
Military and Naval Intelligence, and representatives of the OSS
and the State Department, it had a mandate to prepare strategic
intelligence assessments and daily intelligence summaries. Unlike the
Flying Officer W.A. Field memo, “Notes on a Conference on Co-ordination of
Intelligence Services in Canada,” 16 June 1941, RG24, Vol. 5230, File 19-15-16, Part
1, LAC.

65  
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British JIC, it had no responsibility for coordinating other aspects of
the US intelligence effort.66 The problem for Canada was that there
was no equivalent body in Ottawa to serve as a point of contact
and receive US JIC reports. Initially, US JIC assessments were sent
directly to the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, but this route
was not satisfactory for either side.67 Something had to be done.
Action was spurred by the planned visit to Ottawa in November
1942 of a senior delegation of US intelligence officers representing
the US JIC.68 The service intelligence directors realised that there
was a need to establish a reciprocal structure in Ottawa to manage
Canadian relations with the US JIC. On 3 November Colonel Murray
put forward a proposal for such a body to the CSC on behalf of
the three service intelligence directors. His memorandum began
by declaring that “the operations of the present Directorates is
characterised by a collaboration which is so close and so mutually
co-operative that it is difficult to see how it can be bettered,” but
went on to concede that “nevertheless it would be advantageous to
give this close liaison official sanction in the form of a CANADIAN
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE.” He proposed that the
terms of reference of the US JIC, with slight modification, be adopted
for its Canadian counterpart.69 The CSC formally authorised the
new committee on 10 November. The JIC was established as a
sub-committee of the CSC, to consist of the three heads of service
intelligence with the senior member serving as chair. Its mandate
was “to conduct intelligence studies and to prepare such special
information as may be required by higher authority, or as may be
indicated by the situation.” The committee was authorised to create a
sub-committee to assist in its work and to exchange intelligence with

Canadian Joint Staff (Washington) memo, “Joint Intelligence Committee,” 23
May 1942, sent under cover of Canadian Legation Washington letter to Lester
Pearson, 29 May 1942, RG25, Vol. 3031, File 4043-40C, LAC.
67  
DIA memo to DMI and DNI, 19 November 1942, RG24, Vol. 33541, File 1274-10,
Part 1, LAC.
68  
Canadian Joint Staff (Washington) telegram to NDHQ, 9 October 1942; Stewart
memo to Little, “US Intelligence Officers 16-18 November 1942,” 14 November 1942;
and other documents on the visit of the US delegation, all in RG24, Vol. 33541, File
1274-10, Part 1, LAC.
69  
Murray memo to Secretary CSC, “Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee,” 3
November 1942, RG24, Vol. 5183, File 15-19-30, LAC.
66  
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the US JIC and the UK JIC (Washington).70 The JIC at its creation
was very much a military entity: it reported through the military
chain of command and was made up entirely of military officers. Its
structure and purpose paralleled that of a number of other “joint”
(i.e. tri-service) military committees that coordinated a range of
activities at National Defence Headquarters. Unlike both its UK and
US counterparts, during the war years it had no representative of the
Department of External Affairs.71
The JIC first met as a formal body on 24 November 1942 with
Group Captain Stewart in the chair. Its initial act was to appoint
a Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, whose duties were defined as
“maintenance of inter-service liaison and collaboration in matters
relating to operational intelligence generally, and to undertake such
special assignments as may be referred to them.” The Committee
also discussed the recent visit of the US JIC delegation which had
prompted the creation of its Canadian counterpart.72 The second
meeting dealt with procedures for exchanging information with the
US JIC.73 The Intelligence Sub-Committee began its work on 30
November.74

work of the jic
The weekly meetings of the JIC soon established a regular routine.
Much of the Committee’s attention was taken up with consideration of
security issues, such as censorship, protection of information, security

CSC Minutes, 10 November 1942. Wartime minutes of the CSC can be found
in RG24, Vols. 8081, 8082 File 1272-2, LAC; RG24 Vol. 21813, LAC, contains an
additional set. The UK JIC (Washington) was part of the UK military liaison staff
in the US.
71  
Throughout its history the official name of this body was the Joint Intelligence
Committee, abbreviated JIC. Occasionally the informal abbreviation C[anadian]
JIC was used but this never had official sanction. If it was necessary in official
correspondence to distinguish the Canadian JIC from its allied counterparts the form
JIC (Ottawa) or JIC(O) was sometimes used.
72  
JIC Minutes, 24 November 1942. Wartime JIC minutes held by LAC can be found
in several files including: RG24, Vols. 2468-2469, File 715-10-16-1-3 (DMI copy) and
RG24, Vols. 33541-33542, File 1274-10 (DNI copy), LAC.
73  
JIC Minutes, 1 December 1942.
74  
Lieutenant W.P. Wallace memo to DNI, “First Meeting of the Sub-Committee of
the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee,” 30 November 1942, RG24, Vol. 8088,
File 1274-10-2, LAC. Most minutes of the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee can be
found in this file.
70  

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2020

25

Canadian Military History, Vol. 29 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 1
26

First Steps

of maps and charts, restrictions on photography and the updating
of security regulations. Reflecting the burden of this security-related
work, in April 1943 the CSC authorised a second JIC sub-committee to
deal with security issues.75 In March 1944, Little, now a Commander,
assumed the chair when members proposed that the position should be
rotated annually.76 The Intelligence Sub-Committee met once or twice
a week to exchange information among the three service intelligence
staffs. It also took responsibility for establishing an Inter-Service
Contact Register of persons in Canada who had knowledge of the Far
East.77 It became the practice for the Secretary of the JIC—generally
an officer appointed by the JIC chair from his directorate—to serve as
the chair of the Intelligence Sub-Committee.
In May 1943 the JIC was alarmed by reports of German activity
in Greenland, fearing that the enemy could make similar inroads
into remote parts of Canada. A key problem was obtaining accurate
information from US forces in Greenland. It directed the Intelligence
Sub-Committee to address the situation and considered its report
on 24 June. The “Greenland Report,” the first substantive paper
prepared by the Sub-Committee, was a policy document rather than
an intelligence assessment. No copy of this report has survived, but
it appears to have largely comprised recommendations for obtaining
information from the US. The problem was not a US unwillingness
to share information, but rather a lack of an effective mechanism
to do so. The Sub-Committee recommended the establishment of a
“Northern Information Centre,” but this idea found little favour with
the Chiefs of Staff.78 The JIC remained sporadically engaged with the
Greenland situation during the fall of 1943. DMI was unsuccessful
in obtaining more information via its channels with the US Army. It
was not until February 1944 that the US JIC provided Canada with
detailed reports on the interrogation of a German officer captured in

CSC Minutes, 6 and 27 April 1943.
CSC Minutes, 3 March 1944; and JIC Minutes, 7 March 1944.
77  
Air Vice Marshal W.A. Curtis memo, “Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee,”
19 May 1944, RG24, Vol. 5190, File 15-9-73, LAC.
78  
CSC Minutes, 29 June 1943.
75  
76  
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Greenland over six months earlier. By this point Greenland was no
longer a priority for Canada and took up no more of the JIC’s time.79
Despite this considerable activity, in its early existence the
JIC did not address its primary mandate: to “conduct intelligence
studies”—that is, to prepare strategic intelligence assessments—for
“higher authority.” The Canadian JIC was ostensibly modeled on the
US JIC, which had as its clear purpose the preparation of strategic
assessments for the US Joint Chiefs. To accomplish this, the members
of the US JIC sub-committee were employed full-time in preparing
intelligence assessments. In Canada, the work of the Intelligence SubCommittee was very much a secondary responsibility for its members
and consisted primarily of the exchange of information among the
service intelligence staffs, not the preparation of assessments.
It is not surprising that this was the case. Senior levels of
government and the military made no demands for Canadian-origin
assessments and there was no expectation that strategic analysis
would be carried out in Ottawa. The Chiefs of Staff continued to rely
on Allied assessments for decisions regarding plans for the defence
of Canada. It was the Joint Planning Committee (JPC, responsible
to the CSC for preparing military plans) that was tasked with
determining the likely “Forms and Scales of Attack” that Canada
faced, not the JIC. In its consideration of the threat, the JPC looked
to allies for guidance. In early 1943 it was the UK assessment—with
modifications suggested by Washington—that formed the basis for
recommendations to the Cabinet War Committee concerning revisions
to Canada’s defence plans. Later in the war the CSC looked primarily
to the UK-US Combined Intelligence Committee in Washington for
its assessment of the threat.80 The Chiefs of Staff appear to have
been content to leave the intelligence directors to get on with their
secretive work with minimal interference and few demands.

JIC Minutes, 31 May, 9 and 24 June, 5 July, 7 September 1944, 19 and 24
January, 12 February 1945; and US Army interrogation reports, “Information from
documents and statements of a German officer captured in Greenland 23 July 1943,”
2 September, 2 October, and 16 November 1943, RG24, Vol. 33541, File 1274-10,
Parts 1 and 2, LAC.
80  
See RG24, Vol. 6168, File 15-24-10, LAC and RG24, Reel C-11673, File 9042-1-3,
Part 1, LAC [both files are entitled “Forms and Scale of Attacks”].
79  
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jic intelligence assessments
The available records are silent on what prompted the JIC in mid1943 to take its initial steps towards fulfilling its mandate of producing
strategic assessments. At its meeting on 12 August 1943, the Committee
for the first time discussed the production of “joint appreciation[s].”
It directed the Intelligence Sub-Committee to “conduct a study and
prepare a survey on enemy capabilities, potentialities and intentions”
in the Pacific Theatre and as they affected the east coast of Canada,
Newfoundland and Labrador; these assessments would come to be
known as the Pacific and Atlantic Reports.81
This action appears to have been taken by the JIC on its own
initiative: there is no indication that it was responding to direction
from the CSC or individual Chiefs. But it is interesting to note
that the decision took place at the same time that Defence Minister
J.L. Ralston had asked for an updated assessment of the enemy
threat to the east and west coasts. In responding to this request
the JPC had turned to the Combined Intelligence Committee in
Washington for the intelligence assessment that formed the basis for
its recommendations to the Cabinet War Committee.82 The Canadian
JIC played no role. Faced with this situation, the JIC members may
have felt the need to begin taking the Committee’s mandate seriously
and develop Canada’s own capacity to produce strategic intelligence
assessments or else remain forever in the shadow of the Allies.
Faced with its new and unfamiliar assignment, the Intelligence
Sub-Committee approached DMI for advice on how to proceed. At his
recommendation, it struck an ad hoc committee made up of members
of the three service intelligence directorates to prepare draft reports
for the consideration of the Sub-Committee.83 In practice, over the
following months the line between the Intelligence Sub-Committee
and its drafting group was frequently blurred, since neither of these
roles was full-time and both drew on the same small pool of officers
in the intelligence staffs.
JIC Minutes, 12 August 1943.
Ralston memo to Chief of the General Staff, “Scales of Attack,” 20 July 1943; UKUS Combined Intelligence Committee assessment, “Scale of Attack on the East and
West Coasts of North America,” 13 August 1943; and Chiefs of Staff memo [prepared
by JPC] to Cabinet War Committee, “Forms and Scale of Attack,” 19 August 1943,
all in RG24, Vol. 6168, File 15-24-10, LAC.
83  
Intelligence Sub-Committee Minutes, 13 and 16 August 1943.
81  
82  
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atlantic report
The Intelligence Sub-Committee first turned to the matter of
assessing enemy capabilities and intentions as they affected the East
Coast of Canada, since this task was more limited in scope than
examining the situation in the Pacific. A draft of the Atlantic Report
was tabled at a meeting of the Intelligence Sub-Committee on 20
August and discussed by the JIC three days later. A revised draft
was prepared in mid-September. After spending its full meeting
on 20 September discussing the paper, the JIC approved the final
version on the 24th.84
“Enemy Capabilities in the North Atlantic Area” thus became the
first strategic intelligence assessment produced by the Canadian JIC.
The report totalled twelve pages, beginning with a page-and-a-half
summary of its key findings. The Committee judged that Germany
was capable of launching a raid by a limited number of surface
vessels or submarines, or a raid by long distance aircraft carrying
bombs or paratroopers. In its preliminary draft, the Intelligence
Sub-Committee judged that “the chances of any of the participating
craft returning are so small that the possibility of [such raids] being
undertaken may be disregarded.” In the final version, however, the JIC
left the door slightly ajar by concluding: “It is doubtful that Germany
would be able to carry out [such raids] except on an extremely small
scale.” It went on to speculate that the Germans might consider the
airfield at Goose Bay, Labrador or the aluminium smelter at Arvida,
Quebec to be of sufficient strategic importance to warrant an attack.
In addressing the question of likely German intentions—as opposed
to theoretical capabilities—the report concluded that these “would
appear to be limited to” the use of submarines to attack shipping in
Canadian waters or landing agents or saboteurs in Canada.85
The body of the report was divided into sections prepared separately
by each of the intelligence directorates. The longest section, dealing
with the naval threat, described the current state of the German fleet
and concluded that it was “very improbable” Germany would send

Intelligence Sub-Committee Minutes, 20 and 24 August, and 14 September 1943;
and JIC Minutes, 23 August, and 20 and 24 September 1943.
85  
Draft, “Atlantic Theatre,” 21 August 1943; and JIC Assessment, “Enemy
Capabilities in the North Atlantic Area,” 24 September 1943, RG24, Vol. 33541, File
1274-10, Part 2, LAC.
84  
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a surface naval force to attack Canada, although submarines would
probably continue their attacks in Canadian waters and could land
agents and saboteurs. Under “Military Considerations” the Army had
little to add other than to reiterate the possibility of submarinelanded saboteurs. The air section provided information on the status
of the German air force, and considered the possibility of using
refuelling points in Greenland as well as potential targets in Canada.
It concluded that “a German air attack on Canada […] is technically
possible” and might occur if the Germans determined that an attack
on a target in Canada was more “strategically or psychologically”
significant than on a closer target. The appendices provided detailed
tables on the deployment and status of the German fleet, as well as
performance characteristics of German ships and aircraft. A map
of the northern Atlantic and north-eastern Canada indicated areas
within range of German long-range aircraft.86
The report was important in that it marked the beginning of
Canadian efforts to produce strategic intelligence assessments, but
it nevertheless fell short in many areas. The paper focussed mostly
on theoretical German capabilities. Lacking any secret reporting on
Berlin’s intentions, its findings were largely based on the assumption
that its future actions would look much like its past actions—a sound
but unsurprising conclusion. The naval, military and air aspects were
dealt with separately, in order of service seniority rather than their
relevance to the assessment. This separate treatment of the problem
led to some duplication and minor inconsistencies among these
sections and the paper’s conclusions. The paper demonstrated that
even after the creation of the JIC, the service intelligence directorates
were still working as a loose confederation of independent agencies
rather than a coordinated whole.
The JIC submitted the report to the CSC for its consideration.
The Chiefs noted the report at their meeting of 22 October and
directed that any future JIC assessments should first be submitted
to the Joint Planning Committee, which would then forward it to
the Chiefs with their comments. The CSC stressed that the Joint
Intelligence and the Joint Planning Committees should work closely
together rather than operate as separate entities.87 It is not clear what
JIC Assessment, “Enemy Capabilities in the North Atlantic Area,” 24 September
1943.
87  
CSC Minutes, 22 October 1943.
86  

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol29/iss1/1

30

Barnes: First Steps
BARNES

31

further distribution the report received, but it likely remained limited
to members of the CSC, JPC and JIC; there is no indication that the
report was shared with other government departments in Canada or
with London or Washington.
Almost a year later, the JIC considered and approved a revised
version of the Atlantic Report at an ad hoc meeting on 14 July
1944. This was a slightly shorter assessment—numbering four pages
plus appendices—but covered much the same ground, often using
the same wording. In the “Conclusions” the JIC “considered [it]
improbable that Germany will make any attack on the east coast of
North America.” However, it then seemed to make a fine distinction
between an “attack” and a “raid,” saying that Germany was still
capable of carrying out maritime raids by a small number of surface
vessels or submarines, or air raids by a limited number of long-range
aircraft. But, as with the first report, it went on to say that such raids
were “doubtful […] except on an extremely small scale.” Its judgement
about likely German intentions—that they were limited to the use of
submarines to attack shipping in Canadian waters or landing agents—
was unchanged from the earlier report. The naval section in the body
of the report stated that it was “very improbable” that Germany
would risk “almost certain” destruction of major vessels in a raid on
Canada; the naval threat therefore remained confined to submarines
shelling Canadian targets, attacking shipping in Canadian waters or
landing a small number of agents or saboteurs. The military section
declared that “German military operations [against Canada] can
be ruled out” and, as in the first report, reiterated the possibility
of saboteurs landed from submarines. This report included a new
section on “Psychological Considerations” which assessed that “[i]n
her desire to pave the way for more favourable peace terms, Germany
may attempt to influence public opinion in Canada by subversive
propaganda methods. To this end a limited number of Nazi agents or
contact men could be landed by U-boat or long-range aircraft.” The
air section was shorter than the earlier report but it repeated the
same wording in its bottom-line judgement on the threat of air attack.
The report was distributed to members of the CSC, JPC and JIC.88
This version of the Atlantic Report—along with the Pacific
Report—was also sent to the UK JIC, the first time Canadian
JIC Minutes, 21 July 1944; and JIC Assessment, “Enemy Capabilities in the
North Atlantic Area,” 14 July 1944, RG24, Vol. 33541, File 1274-10, Part 3, LAC.
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strategic assessments had been shared with allies. It was reviewed
by members of the UK Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, the fulltime body that drafted papers for the UK JIC. In their comments
on the report, the British analysts downplayed the German threat
to Canada. They felt that an attack by naval surface vessels was
“extremely unlikely,” and that while a raid by long-range aircraft was
“technically possible, it is very unlikely.”89
Two further revisions of the Atlantic Report were produced, on
22 November 1944 and 11 January 1945. These were much shorter
assessments: two pages with no appendices. Both concluded that “the
danger that Germany will make an attack against the east coast of
North America is negligible.” The reports nevertheless assessed that
Germany continued to be “theoretically” able to launch naval and air
raids against Canada. In the JIC view, German intentions continued
to be focused on submarine attacks in Canadian waters and the
landing of agents and saboteurs. The January 1945 assessment added
the judgement that the Germans also aimed to “keep our present
convoy and air search organisations functioning, thus denying large
forces to European operations.”90 Both reports were sent to members
of the CSC, JPC, JIC and UK JIC.91 No copies were sent to other
Canadian departments or to the US JIC.92

pacific report
The tasking that the Intelligence Sub-Committee received in August
1943 to prepare a report on the enemy’s capabilities and intentions
in the Pacific Theatre involved a much more extensive effort than
the Atlantic Report. Rather than assessing the threat to Canada,
the Pacific Report entailed an evaluation of all aspects of Japan’s

Secretary [UK] Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee memo to Secretary JIC, 3
August 1944, RG24, Reel C-11673, File 9042-1-3, Part 1, LAC; and JIC Minutes, 17
August 1944.
90  
JIC Assessments, “Enemy Capabilities in the North Atlantic Area,” 22 November
1944, RG24, Vol. 5190, File 15-9-73, LAC; and “Enemy Capabilities in the North
Atlantic Area,” 11 January 1945, RG24, Vol. 2469, File 715-10-16-1-3, Part 4, LAC.
91  
The planning staffs compared the JIC assessments with the “Forms and Scales
of Attack” used for defence planning and recommended that no changes be made
to Canada’s defence posture. (Director of Military Operations and Plans memo to
Chief of the General Staff, 6 December 1944, RG24, Reel C-11673, File 9042-1-3,
Part 1, LAC).
92  
JIC Minutes, 22 November 1944, 11 January 1945.
89  
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strategic capabilities and intentions. The Sub-Committee received
little guidance from the JIC on how it should approach this task,
and in its internal discussions grumbled about the “great difficulties
involved in compiling so general a report.” The drafters also suffered
from a lack of information on the strengths and locations of Allied
forces in the Pacific, which would clearly be a key factor in assessing
Japan’s likely actions.93 Unfortunately, no copies of the various
versions of the report exist in the archival files currently open to
researchers.94 Nevertheless, the available records that refer to this
report allow for at least a limited discussion of its contents.
Three versions of the Pacific Report were produced. The first,
“Japanese Capabilities, Potentialities and Intentions,” was dated 10
November 1943. It was subsequently revised as “Estimate of Japan’s
Present Position and Its Potentialities” on 3 April 1944, and “Estimate
of Japan’s Present Position and Intentions” on 8 September 1944.95
These were very substantial reports, comprising a “Conclusions”
section which provided an overview of Japan’s military capacity and
its strategic intentions, eight text sections and up to ten appendices.
Subjects addressed in the text included the “Political and Economic
Situation in Japan” (including issues such as oil, food and armaments
production), “Relations between Japan and Russia,” “Japanese Policy
in China,” “Japanese Intentions in South-east Asia,” the “Situation
in the Netherlands Indies,” and the “Strategic Importance of the
Kuriles.” The appendices included detailed information on Japanese
raw materials, the strength and deployment of Japanese military,
naval and air forces, and topographical and logistic information on
Formosa and the Kurile and Nansei Islands.96 Lacking a complete
copy of the report, its overall conclusions on Japanese intentions are
not known. But it is likely that the paper was largely descriptive,
with only limited and cautious judgements on Tokyo’s future actions.
It is not clear who was the intended readership. The report may have

Intelligence Sub-Committee Minutes, August 1943.
LAC does not hold a copy of the report. The Privy Council Office continues to
hold wartime JIC documents; it has so far refused to release the copy of the Pacific
Report in its possession.
95  
JIC Minutes, 2 November 1943, 6 April, 15 June, 8 September, and 22 November
1944; and summary list of JIC files, n.d. (c. 1944), all in RG24, Vol. 2469, File 71510-16-1-3, Part 3, LAC.
96  
Intelligence Sub-Committee Minutes, 19 June 1944; and Secretary [UK] JIC letter
to Secretary JIC, 1 August 1944, RG24, Vol. 33541, File 1274-10, Part 3, LAC.
93  
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been of some use to military planning staffs by bringing together a
wide range of information on Japan’s capabilities, but this level of
detail was probably less relevant for senior officials.
The preparation of the initial report and its two revisions placed
heavy demands on the Intelligence Sub-Committee and its ad hoc
drafting group over a period of more than a year. The sections of the
report were assigned to individual drafters and the completed sections
discussed as a group. Herbert Norman of External Affairs’ Special
Intelligence Section—probably Canada’s foremost expert on Japan
at that time—and Dr. Jenness of the Inter-Service Topographical
Section provided input into this work, but neither appears to have
been directly involved in the discussion of the drafts. Because much
of the report comprised detailed factual information and the drafting
and revision process was spread over several months, the drafters
had to continually update the paper as new information was received.
Although the work of the Intelligence Sub-Committee was ostensibly
a part-time responsibility, in practice the chair (who also served as
Secretary of the JIC) was required to spend all of his time working
on the paper in the weeks before it went to the JIC for discussion. His
challenge was to reconcile conflicting information and judgements in
the text sections and appendices with each other and with the overall
conclusions of the report.97
The first version of the Pacific Report was not sent to Canada’s
allies, but when the JIC decided in December 1943 to produce a revised
report its main reason for doing so was to have a version that could
be shared with the British JIC.98 When reviewing the revised paper
on 28 April 1944, the CSC rejected the JIC’s recommendation that
copies be sent to the UK and US JICs, saying that “nothing was to
be gained by such action, as the information in the report was readily
available to these organisations.”99 In their subsequent discussion of
the matter, the members of the JIC concluded “that it was important
to maintain the channel which had been opened with the British
J.I.C., and […] that there should be some return to the U.S. J.I.C.
for the papers which they make available to the Canadian services.”
The Committee decided to individually lobby their respective Chiefs

Intelligence Sub-Committee Minutes, 27 March, 3 April and 12 June 1944; and
JIC Minutes, 2 November 1943.
98  
JIC Minutes, 29 December 1943.
99  
CSC Minutes, 28 April 1944.
97  
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to reverse their decision. In this they succeeded, and copies of the
revised report were sent to London and Washington in May.100 The
British JIC responded with six pages of detailed comments which
the Intelligence Sub-Committee considered during the drafting of the
next version of the report.101 In Washington, however, the Canadian
Joint Staff—the tri-service group responsible for liaison with the US
military—raised concerns about Canada producing its own strategic
intelligence assessments:
What we wish to avoid, of course, is anything that may give the U.S.
J.I.C. the impression that we are trying to compete with them in the
preparation of high-level intelligence studies. We feel it would be more
to our advantage to encourage their view that we look to them for all
possible information on the Pacific area. In this way we may obtain
from them more intelligence than they would be disposed to release, if
they assumed that we are in a position and prepared to duplicate the
work they are doing. […] In these circumstances we think it is the part
of wisdom for us to remain, so to speak, in the wings. The Americans
hold the Pacific stage and we incline to the view that it is wise to refrain
from encroaching on it.102

The JIC minutes do not record the response of members to this
proposed abandonment of a vital national intelligence function, nor
is there any record of Washington’s reaction to the Pacific Report.
No further efforts were made to update the Pacific Report after
the third version was produced in September 1944. By this time,
Canada was receiving assessments from the UK/US Combined
Intelligence Committee on Japan’s capabilities and likely future
actions, as well as papers on a range of other subjects.103 The JIC
may have felt that continuing to produce a Canadian version of this
assessment no longer served a useful purpose, especially given the

JIC Minutes, 1, 10 and 23 May 1944; and CSC Minutes, 14 May 1944.
Secretary [UK] JIC letter to Secretary JIC, 1 August 1944, RG24, Vol. 33541,
File 1274-10, Part 3, LAC.
102  
CJS(W) letter to Secretary JIC, 10 June 1944, reproduced in JIC Minutes, 15
June 1944.
103  
UK/US Combined Intelligence Committee Reports, “Estimate of the Enemy
Situation, Pacific-Far East,” 11 September 1944, RG24, Vol. 31018, File Europe
1944-1948, LAC; and “Estimate of the Enemy Situation, Pacific-Far East,” 23
January 1945, RG24, Vol. 8142, File 1480-6, Part 1, LAC.
100  
101  
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heavy demands it placed on the Intelligence Sub-Committee and the
difficulty in keeping up-to-date on the rapidly changing situation.

other jic assessment work
In addition to these broader strategic analyses, the JIC also produced
at least one narrowly-focussed intelligence assessment during the
war. In December 1944 External Affairs contacted the Chiefs of Staff
over concerns about Japanese moves toward Chungking, the location
of the Canadian embassy in China. The request was passed to the
JIC, which assembled a group headed by Dr. Jenness to draft an
immediate assessment to assist in making a decision on whether to
evacuate the embassy. In creating this ad hoc group, it is clear that,
unlike in the UK and US, the JIC did not consider its Intelligence
Sub-Committee to be a standing body for the preparation of
assessments. The drafting group, meeting over two days, prepared a
two-page assessment that concluded: “It is not considered that the
Japanese are intending to attack Chungking in the near future.” The
JIC, in their meeting on 17 December, produced a condensed onepage version of this report as their reply to External Affairs.104
This paper demonstrates that the JIC could produce intelligence
assessments in response to specific requests at relatively short notice,
although it appears it was rarely called upon to do so. On another
occasion, when the Director of Civil Defence in Newfoundland asked
for an assessment of the potential threat of rocket or “V-bomb”
attacks against Newfoundland, it was the Director of Military
Operations and Plans who responded; he concluded that such an
attack was “possible but not probable.”105 The JIC had clearly not
yet established its position in the minds of the Chiefs of Staff as the
obvious place to turn for such an assessment.

104  
JIC Minutes, 15 and 17 December 1944; and “Report of Ad Hoc Committee”
[assessment of Japan’s military intentions in China], 16 December 1944, RG24, Vol.
2469, File 715-10-16-1-3, Part 4, LAC.
105  
CSC Minutes, 19 January 1945.
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canada’s wartime experience of intelligence analysis
Canada began the war with no ability to analyse intelligence on
foreign issues. By the end of the war the censorship programme had
developed a considerable analytical capacity and in External Affairs,
Herbert Norman’s small team had gained experience in producing
all-source analysis of political issues. Much of this reporting—
especially by the censorship programme—was aimed at supporting
the overall Allied intelligence effort rather than meeting specifically
Canadian requirements. In National Defence, the newly-formed
Joint Intelligence Committee commissioned the first Canadian
strategic intelligence assessments. In all of these organisations,
analysts were learning on the job with few precedents and little
organisational guidance. Measured against the tradecraft standards
of later years, their work could be criticised in a number of areas.
Their judgements were often cautious and vague. The JIC reports
were frequently burdened with excessive detail which obscured their
analytical conclusions. Lacking information on enemy intentions, the
reports fell back on assessments of enemy capabilities—sometimes in
theoretical terms—rather than attempting to make judgements on
likely enemy actions. Many of these same comments could be made
of the UK and US wartime assessments; all Allied analytic groups
were dealing with the same learning curve.
With time and experience such methodological shortcomings could
be addressed; more difficult to fix were fundamental challenges that
affected Canadian strategic analysis throughout the war. Foremost
among these was the lack of demand for strategic assessments from
senior Canadian political and military leaders. As C.C. Crean—an
External Affairs officer and key figure in the postwar Canadian
intelligence community—later commented on the wartime work of
the JIC: “no demands were made on the Joint Intelligence Committee
[…] for appreciations, upon which war plans were based, and as a
consequence the intelligence organisation in Canada remained
relatively unimportant and in large measure neglected.”106 Ottawa had
decided largely to avoid making decisions on issues where intelligence
assessments might have made a useful contribution. Canada, through
choice and circumstance, was not involved in the formulation of Allied
106  
G.G. Crean presentation to National Defence College, “Canada’s Intelligence
Organization,” 31 May 1951, RG24, BAN 1997-98/281, Box 1, File 4883, LAC.
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war strategy. The decisions taken by Prime Minister Mackenzie
King’s government dealt primarily with issues around the provision
of military forces and material resources to the Allied coalition rather
than on how those resources should be employed in winning the
war.107 With no call for strategic intelligence assessments from senior
officials, the JIC was left to decide on its own what it might do in
this area. The few assessments it did produce do not appear to have
been received by the Chiefs of Staff with particular enthusiasm. It is
hardly surprising then that the JIC was not more active in producing
such assessments.
Another factor affecting the development of a capacity to carry
out independent intelligence analysis was the role that the UK and
US played in assisting, guiding and shaping Canada’s intelligence
effort. Canada benefited enormously from its intelligence links with
its two closest allies, but these relationships had negative as well as
positive effects on Canada’s efforts to develop its own intelligence
capacity. A key element was the assumption in Ottawa, particularly
among senior military officers, that all necessary intelligence would
come from the Allies. Therefore, anything that might affect this
vital flow of intelligence had to be avoided. The concern expressed
by the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington—that Canada should
not be seen to be trying to compete with its allies in producing
strategic intelligence assessments—was probably shared widely in
Ottawa. Canadian interests could also be affected by the vagaries
of its intelligence relationships and internal rivalries among allied
agencies. The decision to close Norman’s Special Intelligence Section
showed that maintaining good relations with allies and safeguarding
the continued receipt of signals intercepts trumped the production of
Canadian political intelligence assessments.
Some key figures in the wartime intelligence community sought
to make a distinctive Canadian contribution to the Allied intelligence
effort. In particular, officials in External Affairs took pains to see
that Canada’s role in prisoner of war intelligence, censorship and

107  
For an overview of King’s determination to avoid any role in strategic decisionmaking, see Tim Cook, Warlords: Borden, Mackenzie King, and Canada’s World
Wars (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2012), 220-221, 299-300, 303-304, 315-316, 325. For a
broader discussion of Canada and the Allied direction of the war, see C.P. Stacey,
Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa:
Information Canada, 1970), 137-202.
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psychological warfare was recognised.108 Individual military officers
also viewed the relationship with allies as being between partners
and sought to maintain an independent Canadian posture. On a
visit to London, Commander Little was invited to attend a meeting
of the British JIC, where he was dazzled by the “brass around
the table” but “spoke as the head of the Canadian organisation,
willing to co-operate but proud of our own identity and with our
own responsibilities.”109 Nevertheless, most senior military officers in
Ottawa appeared quite willing to subordinate the Canadian role in
intelligence to the wider good of alliance interests. There was little
understanding or appreciation of the value of independent Canadian
intelligence assessments. For these officers, the most important
contribution that Canada could make was aiding in the collection
of intelligence to meet Allied requirements as a quid pro quo for
the continued receipt of Allied secret reporting and assessments. In
this view of Canada’s role, the production of strategic intelligence
assessments in Ottawa contributed little to the Allied effort and in
some circumstances might even undermine other more important
elements of the intelligence relationship.
The creation of the Joint Intelligence Committee, a key step
in the development of the Canadian intelligence community during
the war, was itself primarily driven by the need to safeguard
relations and information flows with allies. As we have seen, its
mandate—which assigned it responsibility for producing strategic
assessments—was modeled on that of the US JIC. However, despite
this surface resemblance, the wartime Canadian JIC was a rather
different creature than its US and UK namesakes. Unlike both the
UK and US JICs, the Canadian JIC played only a very limited
role in producing strategic assessments during the war. Unlike the
corresponding sub-committees in the US and UK, the Canadian JIC’s
Intelligence Sub-Committee was not principally a drafting group for
strategic assessments. Unlike the UK JIC, the Canadian JIC had no
responsibility for coordinating the broader intelligence community in
Ottawa. Even within the Department of National Defence, it played
only a limited role in coordinating intelligence matters; it was careful
not to encroach on the mandates of the service intelligence directorates
and consequently only dealt with issues that all three agreed should
Don Page, “Tommy Stone and Psychological Warfare in World War Two,” 110-120.
Little, “Now it Can All be Told,” 222.
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be handled jointly. For the most part, this meant that during the war
the Canadian JIC dealt primarily with security and administrative
issues, and its Intelligence Sub-Committee was largely occupied
with the exchange of intelligence among the service intelligence
directorates. Nevertheless, the Canadian JIC did accomplish its
true—albeit unstated—purpose: to provide an effective conduit for
the receipt of strategic intelligence from the US and UK JICs. The
overwhelming requirement for Canada was to facilitate the vital flow
of intelligence from allies. In this the Committee succeeded.
In the waning months of the war there were some signs that the
JIC recognised a need to broaden its role by bringing non-military
organisations into its ambit. On 25 June 1945 the Chiefs of Staff
approved a recommendation from the JIC that representatives of the
Department of External Affairs and the RCMP be invited to join the
Committee as associate members.110 This provided a broader view
of Canadian intelligence requirements and a more comprehensive
structure to address them. It also brought the organisation of the
Canadian JIC closer into line with that of the UK and US JICs,
which included representatives from the Foreign Office and State
Department. The JIC now looked very much like the “Central
Intelligence Committee” that had been mooted four years earlier.
Time would tell whether this expanded body would grow into the
wider role it had implicitly created for itself.
By mid-1945 discussions were taking place concerning the postwar
shape of the Canadian intelligence community. Much of this focussed
on the organisation and management of signals intelligence.111 But
some members of the intelligence community were also thinking in
broader terms about the need for a capacity to carry out intelligence
analysis and to produce independent strategic assessments to inform
Canadian policy. This argument was put forward in a September 1945
memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff written by Colonel Murray on
behalf of the JIC on the subject of “Foreign Intelligence in Peacetime.”
Murray flagged Canada’s almost complete dependence on intelligence
from the UK and US, warning that it “virtually compels us to accept
the assessment of others” on key issues of importance to Canada.
His memo proposed the creation of a “Joint Coordinating Bureau of
Intelligence” which would be the “nerve centre for the collection and
CSC Minutes, 25 June 1945; and JIC Minutes, 6 July 1945.
Jensen, Cautious Beginnings, 117-136.
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digestion of Foreign Intelligence.” He went on to say: “There can be
no useful or intelligent digestion of information unless it goes through
a stage where it is analysed and examined alongside other relevant
information of a like nature, that is available from other sources.”112
However, this view from within the intelligence community was not
backed by any call from policy-makers for such a Canadian analytical
capacity or for Canadian-origin strategic assessments. The question
of the level of demand in Ottawa for strategic analysis would be an
important issue affecting the development of a Canadian intelligence
assessment capacity in the years following the Second World War.113
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112  
Murray memo to CSC, “Foreign Intelligence in Peacetime,” 26 September 1945,
RG24, Vol. 6178, File 22-1-43, Part 1, LAC. Murray had become chair of the JIC
in June 1945.
113  
See Barnes, “A Confusion, not a System.”
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